The November 3 US presidential elections evoked a tide of articles that, at least in our shared Central European region, mostly focused on the possible consequence of a newcomer Biden administration for Poland or Hungary, both supporting a continuous Trump presidency.
This resulted from the notion of the diminishing boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, further complicating anyone's job who aims at dealing with pure foreign policy issues. The “unbridgeable gap” between the Republican and Democrat sides, however, in some issues linked to Central Europe is not as wide as it seems to be.
No matter how untrue and hurtful were presidential candidate Joe Biden's words directed towards Warsaw and Budapest (and no matter how damaging could those comments be), there are a few policy issues where any possible change in an US administration will likely not result in U-turns in executed foreign policy. What connects them is their possible implications on Central European countries.
US foreign policy is not only executed by the White House, various departments (such as the Department of State or the Department of Energy), and the US Congress also play a role in it. In the wake of 2019/2020 bipartisan initiatives, US congress supported the strengthening of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a key foreign policy instrument for Poland whose future is likely to have huge consequences on Central Europe. 3SI proved to be instrumental for the main US foreign policy goal of pushing back on Russian and Chinese malign influence in the forms of energy policy and 5G development, respectively.
The approach the US took concerning the Initiative was simple: Washington wanted more European ownership over 3SI (financially speaking as well), and when this was not met, US politicians stepped up twice to reinforce the framework. US DoS Mike Pompeo in the 2020 Munich Security Conference pledged a conditional sum of USD 1 billion that was later on topped by an additional USD 300 million in the October 2020 Tallinn 3SI Summit.
These two contributions basically paved a way forward to an executed US foreign policy that will most likely not change. A COVID-19-striken US economy is in a desperate need of any contracts it can sign at international markets as well. The path that the current US administration signposted e.g. with getting a deal with their Romanian counterparts for US companies' involvement in CE railroad development is clear: any kind of lend-lease-type agreement is not only more than welcome, but serves as a win-win for the Transatlantic relationship.
Resulting from steps made by the US congress, the Polish (and other Central European) state organs made, pushing back on Russia concerning regional energy security is a process that, in perspective, is complete. The next big task is to stand up against China in the field of digital policies. In the light of Apple's 2020 signalling to move production out of China, it is likely that a Biden administration will follow suit.
Moreover, recent bipartisan signals to curb big tech companies' power also signals the prevailing of certain traits in US policies over the aisle. Some of these companies have been recently investing in CEE (especially in the Polish market), dividing them up will likely have implications in Central Europe as well.
If the Democrats would be at the driving wheel of the White House for the term 2020-2024, rhetorics will definitely change. Albeit that the Trump administration was not shy in criticizing CE countries on some of their policies, effective criticism was done using the "classical" diplomatic channels, and not the press. There is a likelihood that a Democrat administration would change this (referring back to tone of some of the Biden campaign ads), showing a harder stance concerning e.g. Chinese investments. On top of it, the harsh confrontation of ideologies could easily result in a more openly confrontational tone from Washington, contributing also to the toning down of moderate Democrat opinions who share (at least partially) the Republican approach of focusing on joint issues and criticizing the other behind closed doors.
NATO remained the cornerstone of the Transatlantic relationship even during a Trump administration that was very much vocal concerning the (financial) future of the Alliance. Applying criticism here is just, however, we must note that the only main difference as compared to the 2012-2016 era is the harsher rhetorics: President Obama also wanted allies to allocate more for NATO.
The Achilles heels of a possible Biden administration's viewpoint on Central European countries will likely be shaped by its approach to Germany, a line in US foreign policy that the Trump administration definitely changed, and changed in a way that favored Central European countries.
Rhetorics, and a very different approach to the third wave of human rights (gender, rights of sexual minorities, etc.) will also play a huge factor in between a Democrat White House and Central European countries. Chances are high that a “trench war” will emerge, with little chance of understanding the other side.
Foreign policy analyst Zsombor Zeöld holds an MA in Central and Eastern European Studies from the Jagiellonian University. As a former CEPA–HIF Andrássy Fellow in Washington D.C., his main research topic is the Three Seas Initiative. Currently he's the Program Director of the Budapest Fellowship Program.