Poland and Hungary are known in Europe not only for their very good bilateral relations but also, above all, for their cooperation in defending common values and interests in the international arena, especially within the European Union. The two countries have enjoyed very warm relations for many years, which is due to their shared history, cultural ties, and often similar foreign policy goals. All this is reflected in formats such as the Visegrad Group (V4) and the Three Seas Initiative (TSI). Professor Maciej Szymanowski, director of the Wacław Felczak Institute for Polish-Hungarian Cooperation, spoke about Polish-Hungarian relations, cooperation in the region, and the institution that deepens these multilevel relations.
Adrian Kolano’s Interview with Professor Maciej Szymanowski
Fot. JAP
How do you perceive bilateral relations between Poland and Hungary in the current dynamically changing international environment?
It happened so historically that our countries came into being at a very similar time, at the time of global warming – in Central Europe, it was even warmer then than it is today. The kingdoms of Poland and Hungary began to exist almost simultaneously, and we remember Saint Kinga and Saint Hedvig very well. Since the Middle Ages, we have been ringing the bells in Polish churches at noon to commemorate the great victory of Hungarian arms over the Turks in the Battle of Belgrade in 1456. At the moment, we are after the new independence after 1989, we are members of the EU, NATO, the Visegrad Group, the Three Seas Initiative, and we cooperate closely with each other. This cooperation is good and, at times, even very good, both on a strictly political level and lower, between local governments. I once compared Polish-Hungarian contacts – perhaps not at the state level, but those between counties, provinces, and customs offices in the Visegrad Group and the Weimar Triangle. As far as V4 is concerned, they are ten times more intensive. Relations with Hungary are particularly good locally, especially in the south and east of Poland. The trade exchange, which, of course, is counted in billions and amounts to about 10 billion euros annually, stands out from this.
I am satisfied with every new Hungarian company that invests in Poland, or vice versa. I am glad that a year ago the Polish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce was established and there are other initiatives of this kind being launched. Unfortunately, we are also falling behind in terms of infrastructure. North-South routes, as we know them, are far behind those between the east and the west. The train journey time between Warsaw and Budapest still takes the same time as it did under Edward Gierek (who was the First Secretary of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party in the Polish People's Republic in 1970). These are still things that we should make up for in the coming years.
Unfortunately, sometimes we, Poland and Hungary, are subject to joint criticism from those who are not fans of Poland's active approach or Warsaw's or Budapest's opinion on many issues, especially regarding the future of the European Union. There is now a very strong tendency to move away from the EU rules in the name of the idea of a superstate. Poland and Hungary have very similar views on this matter. We have a lot in common, which does not mean that there is nothing we could improve. I am very pleased that, for example, the Hungarian Foreign Minister visits Warsaw almost every month and that top high-level meetings are held at least every two to three months, regardless of the pandemic. Perhaps we could soon introduce the model of consultation already present between Poland and some of our partners, for example, the Czech Republic or Spain, which involve joint government meetings. We should keep a record of the ideas that have been discussed for a long time but have not produced much progress.
I think that in the coming years the Visegrad Group should pay particular attention to strengthening cooperation, at least to the extent achieved by the Nordic Council or the Benelux. I would really like this to happen. Informal consultations have their advantages, they constitute an additional guarantee of the full eligibility of all members of the Visegrad Group, but, on the other hand, they lack supervision of certain political assumptions through a kind of secretariat, an institution that would be able to effectively implement decisions made at the political level.
We are now discussing what unites us, and I am personally convinced that our countries have much more on the common ground than they have apart. However, there are certainly some divergences that we still need to work on. What are these major differences and shortcomings in our cooperation that we could improve in the future?
In international politics, we certainly differ in our approach to the Russian Federation. In this context, the Hungarians take Berlin's view that Russia is what it is, it will not change, and we should communicate and even do business with it. This is precisely the approach by which Berlin, like Budapest, is even more strongly in favor of sanctions, but is also investing in Russia to circumvent them.
Is there any other significant difference? Certainly, over the years there has been greater skepticism about the United States, although Poland has been one of the great optimists for generations. Therefore, the image of the US is especially positive in Poland compared to other European nations. This has changed during Trump's presidency, and we will see if Hungary becomes less skeptical. Perhaps the Poles will also gain distance from the current policies of the new American administration. Of course, Hungary, as a smaller country with somewhat more limited ambitions, sometimes perceives Poland's actions as too bold, as unrealistically optimistic, and usually, without saying it aloud or trying to undermine our arguments, maintains a certain distance. Of course, this is what it is about and is essential. As a Pole, frankly speaking, I am proud that Polish foreign policy after 1989, and certainly in the last years, paid a lot of attention to the fact that we should conduct politics with other countries in our region of Europe, including Hungary, as both free and equal, to avoid imposing anything. This is how the Visegrad Group operates – we agree on what we agree on, and in other cases, we inform each other directly during the consultations preceding every important EU summit. This kind of principle prevails also in Polish-Hungarian relations, which is natural. In his actions, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán pursues the Hungarian national interest – just as Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki pursues the Polish national interest.
This year we are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Visegrad Group. What are the opportunities and challenges for the whole format in the coming years?
I am very pleased that, as part of the Polish presidency of the Visegrad Group in the year of its 30th anniversary, a powerful declaration of the prime ministers was adopted on February 15. I encourage you to read it. It sets out the tasks for the coming years and what the V4 should do as an alliance of four countries and mentions many issues related to infrastructure, including cyberinfrastructure and energy security. We will undoubtedly have to actively participate in the discussion on the future shape of the EU, and here we are in complete agreement with Hungary. It is clear that this is a country like Great Britain or Poland in the past, with a tradition of its own union. It treats this type of ideas, such as those pushed for example by Germany, with a certain degree of skepticism and caution. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, for example, said that the right of veto should be abolished as it would make the European Union operate more efficiently. In certain cases, the EU would perhaps indeed function better without the right of veto. But this is no accident that the unions we know from history have had this right, as this tool guarantees equality of rights for all entities. When there is no equality of rights, the only thing that remains is waiting until the union breaks up – we can find such incidents in history.
In this case, we certainly agree that the Visegrad Group should keep this tool. The Czechs and Slovaks share the experience of Czechoslovakia: it did not last that long, but it was also a union. When both of its members, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, failed to transform it into full subjective entities, the state disintegrated very quickly, literally two years after regaining independence. Countries like Poland and Hungary raise in public debate the question of what the European Union is and what it was initially for, to integrate the European continent. The European Union is in Europe, but Europe is not in the European Union. After all, there are European countries that do not belong to the EU. Some want to, some do not, and some would just like to build good relations with it. However, we must not forget about the countries that are applying for membership; we must not put them on any blacklist. I think that in a discussion about the future of the EU, such as the one that started in May and will last for a year, conducted by the European Commission and the European Parliament, it will be the Poles and the Hungarians who will emphasize that there are other European countries. The point is that this is a discussion about the future not only of the EU, but of Europe as a whole.
There is, of course, a big problem under the title of “the great power ambitions of the Russian Federation”, increasingly linked to an even bigger problem, namely the change of power in the Kremlin and the associated tensions. In authoritarian countries, a change of leadership always leads to high tensions, sometimes even to civil war. Therefore, this is something that we, as the Visegrad Group, must cooperate on to the best of our ability. Furthermore, the Bucharest Nine and NATO's eastern flank must play a leading role in the Alliance's policy. The EU should also act much more decisively towards the Russian Federation and the countries located, as Russia calls it, in the near abroad (post-Soviet states).
There are certainly big challenges ahead for the post-COVID-19 world. This is so nicely called shortening the supply chain. It is clear that the relocation of production to China resulted not only in shortages of essential products, such as protective masks, in the first period of the pandemic. These are obvious things, but there are also more complicated problems, such as the question of which industries should not be moved from the jurisdiction of nation-states to the European Union and thus relocated too hastily. We can see that in crises, this generates substantial problems. We face, of course, another stage of a technological revolution that changes the profile of economic activity and even of communication between people. All of these things should be the subject of discussion between our countries.
I think we agree that to effectively respond to the challenges ahead, we must be united and act in solidarity. Do you think that in the long run conflicts within the Visegrad Group and bilateral conflicts, such as the one around Turów, may cause a permanent split in the V4?
It happens that the Visegrad Group traces its origins to the time of my youth and that I have been professionally involved in it. In fact, I have followed its development for as long as three decades. One of its greatest achievements is that in all political circles, left, center, and right, there is already a very large group of people who realize that the cooperation of two or more countries always increases their effectiveness in international politics. This can be seen in Central Europe. We are all aware that Central European states will either conduct their policies in agreement with each other, and the success of one of these states will at least in part translate to the success of the others, or the failure of one of them will become the failure of the rest. Otherwise, we will enter a well-worn path used for centuries by external forces under the slogan of divide et impera. In such a scenario, individual states serve what seem to be their interests but primarily the interests of the sovereign, no matter whether from the east or the west. This leads nowhere, certainly not to the prosperity of Central Europe. This region, organized as it is at present, is the fastest-growing part of the world.
The last 30 years have also shown that we can communicate with each other. There have been incidents and I even remember a time when the President of Hungary was considered persona non grata on Slovak territory. There were also times when Hungarian parties were part of the Slovak government. At the moment, Hungarian diplomacy has supported Slovakia, for example, in the context of vaccines. Incidental conflict will occur; it is natural. However, everyone is aware, and I am absolutely optimistic in this matter, that a return to what happened between us during the interwar period will not help anyone and will certainly do harm.
Last December, the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund raised an additional 43 million euros in commitments. 23 million euros were invested by the Slovenian development bank SID Bank and 20 million euros by the Hungarian Eximbank. As a consequence, Slovenia and Hungary join Poland, Romania, Estonia, and Latvia as key investors. This already demonstrates Hungary's real commitment to the Three Seas Initiative. Nevertheless, what are the biggest threats to the TSI?
The Initiative has been a success, and we should emphasize it. Five or six years ago, the TSI was an unknown concept, and now it is a well-known platform of cooperation. It accumulates financial resources, and as part of it, some investment projects are shaped and prepared. It is also a format that Germany wants to join. This is good news, but what will decide, in my opinion, about the future and the effectiveness of the TSI is the involvement of the United States, also financial. We heard various promises from the previous administration, for which we are very grateful, but that does not yet meet the ambitions of the Initiative.
The pandemic slowed the talks conducted by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), a Polish national development bank, with investors from, for example, Japan and South Korea. I hope that after the pandemic calms down, the parties will resume talks. We have a list of various investments, but without an inflow of large external funds, the backlogs, for instance infrastructure-related, will not be caught up. A challenge facing our region of Europe is the question of energy independence. The energy revolution, which is one of the priorities of the EU, is difficult for us in many respects and requires considerable investment. In addition, we need to become independent of the supplier from the East as it can hardly be qualified as a reliable and calculable partner.
Bearing in mind the words of Beata Daszyńska-Muzyczka, President of the Management Board of BGK, the resources from the Three Seas Initiative Fund alone will not satisfy investment needs of the region. We also need funds from the European Union. Do you think that the conflict around Nord Stream 2 and the EU's energy policy may ruin our chances for them?
The European Union likes to present itself as a gentlemen's club. It is, without a doubt, a club of gentlemen, too, but it is also a place of hard-fought self-interest. Nord Stream 2 is an example of European “antisolidarity” and a ruthless fight for the economic and political benefits of Berlin and, of course, Moscow. We must look at the situation realistically. If we, the countries in our region, want real support from EU funds, we must fight hard for this money. The EU, and especially Germany, which does not always want to remember this, has gained a lot from the accession of our two countries into this international organization. After its reunification, Germany entered a period of stagnation, or even an economic recession, which lasted until the countries of our region joined the EU. Some German companies went bankrupt, but because they entered the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian markets, they became prosperous. For example, there is a chain of cosmetic stores that we have in the centers of all major Polish cities. Therefore, it was a great help – not only for German companies but also for the economies in general of both Germany and France. Now, when our companies are trying to enter these markets, which is not always successful (an example being transport companies), two countries must be better than one, and so the Three Seas Initiative can play a role which the Visegrad Group, Benelux, or the Nordic Council once played. If we are united and act as a group that operates, for example, in the formula of southern European countries that can provide themselves with additional resources, we will be victorious. Hopefully, we will follow this path.
I would generally be optimistic about that, but it will certainly not be easy. The reason is that there is a widespread tendency, especially in countries that in recent years have not been able, for various reasons, such as political crises, to carry out structural reforms. Spain or Italy are perfect examples of this, as these countries are now struggling with serious difficulties. Young people entering the labor market, apart from the fact that they have gigantic problems finding a job, live at a much lower level than their parents' generation, quite opposite to Poland. There is a feeling there that the countries in this part of Europe have gained significantly from subsidies and that we should now share our wealth with them. This is how it is presented, all the more so because very often the politicians in power in these countries are unable to carry out these structural reforms effectively, as was the case in the countries of our region after 1989.
The price of social reforms in Poland in the early 1990s was huge. The unemployment rate reached even double digits, 20–30% in many Polish provinces. In fact, a very large part of Poles had to change their jobs, often also towns or countries of residence, because they simply could not get a job. Parties appeared and disappeared; some gained 30% in one election and 5% in another. They paid a good social price for those reforms, thanks to which we are doing quite well today, even in times of crisis. It is no coincidence that the financial crisis hit the Polish economy to a small extent, similarly to the one linked to the pandemic. It affected us to some level, of course, but only to a small extent; it was due to the reforms and, certainly, the very hard work of the Poles. It turns out that the Polish economic model is quite flexible and resilient even to unexpected events such as financial market crashes in the United States or the pandemic, which, after all, locked many entrepreneurs in their homes for many weeks.
I would also like to talk about the Wacław Felczak Institute for Polish-Hungarian Cooperation. You have been its director since its foundation in 2018. The Institute deals with comprehensive activities in the development of Polish-Hungarian relations and the building of Hungary's social capital. Could you tell us more about the Institute's mission, achievements, and plans?
Our institute probably has the widest scope of responsibilities in Poland because we deal with science, education, economy, culture, sport, and many other areas. At the same time, we are a very small institute (we employ only several people) with a very flexible, I think, activity system, modeled after German or Chinese organizations. For example, we run Polish language teaching at the secondary school level in Hungary, Hungarian language teaching at the secondary school level in Poland, we organize scientific conferences, summer schools for young academics, where we discuss topics ranging from global warming to the Three Seas Initiative or the future of the EU, which we are going to discuss this year. We published “The Visegrad Atlas”, a compendium not only on the history and geography of the Visegrad Group. What you can also learn from it is the situation of sports in the Visegrad Group and the condition of health services in our countries. Of course, the data had been presented using scientific measures. The Atlas was prepared with the participation of about forty people from the Polish Academy of Sciences. Our task is to educate, to transfer these good contacts and Polish-Hungarian traditions to young people, professionally active people, not necessarily to educate future Polish speakers. We want to reach those Hungarians who have better than average knowledge about Poland and Central Europe. The same applies to Poland. The aim is to make people who work as journalists, doctors, but also lawyers get a better than average idea about Central Europe, especially about contemporary Hungary and its neighbors.
It is simply so no matter what kind of economy, 4.0 or 5.0, we are already having in our civilization, or we are about to implement, no matter what great communicators our scientists and IT experts will invent, what is the most important is people and their knowledge. There has been this research in Poland that about 2.5 million Poles are actively interested in public affairs and understand them, which is about the same as in the times of Polish nobility. A similar situation occurs in international contacts. They are based on several tens of thousands of people representing different fields. This is often due to family reasons, personal experiences, or finding the right place in which we, as an institute, try to operate. It may be a university, school, or sports institution. What is important is that a person has a positive association with the other country and that they learn as much as possible about it.
The level of awareness of Hungarians or Poles about contemporary Poland and Hungary is not the best. In fact, it is very poor. Research shows that the most famous living Pole among Hungarians is Lech Wałęsa, and only 7% of them were able to recognize him in the picture. In Poland, it looks a bit better only when it comes to Viktor Orbán, but apart from him, Poles cannot name any of the living Hungarians, even during the pandemic.
For instance, there is a professor, Katalin Karikó, who has developed a method on which all vaccines against COVID–19 are now based (mRNA protein). No one knows her in Poland. It is clear that our universities are very much focused on contacts with the universities west of the Polish borders, and the situation is similar in Hungary. However, the academic cooperation between Poland and Hungary is very weak. We have scholarship programs within our funds, so we are trying to change it. We are very happy with the agreements that have already been made, those that are still in progress, as well as with the exchange programs between our universities. Of course, universities in western Europe are very good, but not as good as we often think. Unfortunately, all European universities, including Polish ones, tend to fall in the world rankings every year. However, this cooperation is important because, in the days of its construction, our institute had a considerable problem in finding people with a good level of Hungarian in Warsaw. The situation is similar in Hungary where good Polish translators are usually in their fifties or sixties. One can already say that there is a certain regression in mutual scientific collaboration, for example, between historians or representatives of other areas, in comparison to what it was before 1989. It is our task to point to these areas and suggest them to those responsible, for instance, government administrations in both countries, marshal offices, and local governments. It is our important task to inform people about this and help as much as we can.
We also have grant programs, including those for kindergartens, where children draw, for example, Hungarians in their folk costumes, which a wise teacher had shown them beforehand. There were some drawings in which the color of their skin was black – perhaps some children thought that Hungary is located somewhere in Africa; that it is that far away. From Szczecin, it is a bit farther away than from Warsaw, but we are also actively involved in events in some other places, such as the Karpacz Economic Forum. We invite, for example, those responsible for such projects as the high-speed railway line connecting Warsaw and Budapest, an undertaking which is now being born. It would be good if it entered the investment phase as soon as possible because there are still too many things that are missing from Polish-Hungarian and, more broadly, the Central European relations, which gives rise to a general lack of satisfaction. And if someone wise has already decided that this kind of institute should be created, if only to break down the enormous language barrier between our countries, then it will certainly translate into benefits for both our countries. Unfortunately, an average Pole cannot communicate when traveling to Hungary; this is also a reason why the level of knowledge of Poles about this country is slightly lower than about the Czech Republic or Ukraine. This is why this institute was established. I am very glad that I had the honor of directing its work at the beginning of its activity, not to mention the fact that when I was a scholarship holder, I had the opportunity to meet Professor Felczak, who was a great supporter of Polish-Hungarian and Central European cooperation. He spoke and wrote a lot about it and dedicated much of his health to the cause. It was no coincidence that, as a courier, he was subjected to such torture after his arrest at the end of the war – at the time, the Communists in Moscow detested people who tried to do everything to make Central European countries cooperate.